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Abstract 
The claustrum has been proposed as a possible neural candidate for the coordination of conscious 
experience due to its extensive “connectome”. Herein we propose that the claustrum contributes to 
consciousness by supporting the temporal integration of cortical oscillations in response to 
multisensory input. A close link between conscious awareness and interval timing is suggested by 
models of consciousness and conjunctive changes in meta-awareness and timing in multiple 
contexts and conditions. Using the striatal beat-frequency model of interval timing as a framework, 
we propose that the claustrum integrates varying frequencies of neural oscillations in different 
sensory cortices into a coherent pattern that binds different and overlapping temporal percepts into a 
unitary conscious representation. The proposed coordination of the striatum and claustrum allows 
for time-based dimensions of multisensory integration and decision-making to be incorporated into 
consciousness. 
Introduction 
Consciousness is not a unitary phenomenon, but a class of states that can be viewed as distributed 
along a continuum of arousal or awareness ranging from none to full awareness [1, 2, 3•]. 
Conscious awareness varies considerably within an individual across different contexts, such as 
non-conscious (or minimally-conscious) states as in non-REM sleep to fully conscious states as in 
normal wakefulness [4]. The identification of the neural correlates of consciousness is both an 
enduring challenge in consciousness science and the focus of much research although our 
understanding of how the brain enables conscious states and how shifts in brain states contribute to 
fluctuations in consciousness remains in its infancy [5]. Emerging evidence from studies of 
awareness across time, alterations in meta-awareness involving changes in neural synchronization, 
and clinical populations characterized by distortions in awareness, suggest a close intersection 
between conscious states and interval timing.  Consequently, temporal integration mechanisms 
have been implicated in the neural substrates of consciousness [6, 7]. Moreover, the primary 
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neurophysiological correlates of consciousness in these studies has been neural synchronization as 
a function of alternation between phasic and sustained activity [8, 9•, 10, 11, 12]. 
  In recent years, the claustrum was proposed as a possible neural candidate for the 
coordination of conscious awareness [13, 14] and to play a key role in integrating diverse sources of 
neural information during the formation of unified conscious percepts [15, 16]. The interhemispheric 
connections of the claustrum enable the coordination of bilateral cortical functions by way of its 
ipsilateral and contralateral connections with prefrontal, premotor, and motor areas. Working from 
the starting point that subjective time constitutes the “infrastructure of consciousness” [17] we 
propose that the claustrum plays a crucial role in consciousness by supporting the temporal 
integration of cortical and thalamic oscillations involved in the multiplexing of sensory input used for 
interval timing and working memory [18•]. 
The continuity of experience transduced by temporal integration is one of the defining 
features, if not the defining feature, of consciousness [19]. Accordingly, a first step in addressing the 
relevancy of time in consciousness requires a re-evaluation of what is meant by "conscious 
processing” and the control of an internal clock [20•, 21]. On closer examination, a process might be 
said to be "conscious" in three distinct senses. 
(a) one is aware of the process 
(b) the operation of the process is accompanied by awareness (of its results) and 
(c) awareness enters into or causally influences the process. 
Crick and Koch provided an outline for the scientific study of consciousness [15]. In this 
framework, the authors proposed that an alternative to tackling the “hard problem” of qualia [22] 
would be to identify some neural correlate(s) of consciousness in causal terms, that is, “finding a 
minimal set of neuronal events that gives rise to a specific aspect of a conscious percept”. As a 
consequence, they focused exclusively on neural activity related to a specific sensory modality, i.e. 
the visual system of primates, leaving unexplored other aspects of consciousness, such as emotion 
and self-awareness. Although we, in principle, agree with Crick and Koch’s perspective, we maintain 
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that consciousness science should investigate how inputs from different sensory channels can 
emerge as a complete picture of our ever-changing conscious experience. As a consequence, any 
specific sensory percept is construed as one input to this emergent principle of coalition. In other 
forums, this has traditionally been referred to as the ‘neural binding’ problem [23]. 
It is easily overlooked that humans share with other animals a remarkable ability to estimate 
the durations of events and subjectively experience a sense of time passing [24]. It is also tempting 
to assume that the experience of conscious states, and in particular self-awareness, is dependent 
upon the ability to perceive duration and to understand the concepts of past, present, and future [25, 
but see 26] which leads researchers to face the dilemma of whether non-human animals have 
human-like conscious experience. Although performing a classic timing task such as the peak-
interval procedure [27, 28] may not require complete awareness of time passing, more 
fundamentally our conscious experience may actually be organized by an underlying timing 
mechanism. Indeed, distinct from physical entities that have multiple dimensions (at least three 
dimensions in space and one dimension in time in classical physics), time is arguably the only 
dimension for mental entities (e.g., thought, feeling, sensory perception, etc.), unless they have 
other dimensions that could only be measured in a phenomenal world [13]. Therefore, it is intriguing 
to question whether our subjective experiences coalesce mainly because we have a built-in 
temporal integration process that coordinates different channels of inputs into uniform subjective 
states. This is particularly important not only because of the “hard problem” of consciousness that 
has lingered for centuries, but also because timing is disrupted in various mental disorders [29] that 
can be regarded as “disorders of conscious experience” and thereby may prove valuable in 
elucidating basic mechanisms and developing treatments. One example is schizophrenia, because 
schizophrenic patients have a distorted sense of reality and temporal structure [30, 31]. Another 
example is pathological gambling, because pathological gambling can be directly associated with an 
altered state of consciousness, dysfunctional risk assessment, and a skewed perception of time and 
rate of return [32]. The observation that pathological gamblers exhibit reduced gamma 
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synchronization in paralimbic cortical structures during rest as well as an impairment in task-related 
changes compared to controls has been associated with a loss of conscious coherence [33]. 
Behavioral studies suggest that gamblers may be ultra-sensitive to time and experience a delusional 
high rate of return in various aspects of their lives [34]. Consequently, disrupted optimization of 
timing abilities and impaired self-awareness may contribute to compulsive gambling behavior [32, 
34, 35••]. 
Consciousness, metacognition and interval timing 
By definition, consciousness refers to awareness of one’s unique thoughts, feelings and 
sensations of the environment. A key characteristic is that these experiences are constantly shifting. 
The ever-shifting stream of thoughts can change dramatically from one moment to the next, but 
one’s experience of it seems smooth and effortless. How does the brain enable such continuity of 
experience and what are the essential mechanisms for the emergence of conscious experience? 
Three possible criteria can be derived from ‘higher-order’ theories of consciousness [36] and 
‘integrated information theory’ [37]:  
1. The ability to select one state out of the indefinite possibilities (differentiated information) 
e.g., differences between a light sensor and a conscious agent. 
2. The ability to have awareness of mental representations (metacognition; second-order 
representations). 
3. The ability to tag personal meaning to the state. 
It is important to note that there exist fundamental differences between sensitivity (non-conscious) 
and awareness (conscious): sensitivity relies on the first-order representation in the system, 
whereas awareness relies on the second-order representation in the system. That is, sensitivity 
entails the ability to respond in specific ways to certain states of affairs, whereas awareness requires 
the agent to have the knowledge of the fact that she or he is sensitive to some state of affairs and 
also cares about a certain state of affairs. For example, a camera doesn’t lack consciousness 
because it’s only sensitive to light, but because it has no awareness of being sensitive to light. One 
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could only make the camera conscious by enabling a second-order mechanism that could 
coordinate its moments of recording light with its memory of past recordings of light, as well as its 
own preference for that particular moment of light-sensing and memory traces – this mechanism 
could obviously be the time-keeping mechanism described above. For such a higher-order timing 
mechanism to work, each channel of inputs must have its own clock(s) so that these clock phases 
can be synchronized to form a representation of the present –– “now”. The proposal that we present 
in this review is that the claustrum is critical for the type of temporal integration required by 
consciousness. 
A further link between metacognition and interval timing is suggested by psychological 
manipulations that alter conscious states and distort time perception as well as by disorders of 
consciousness. Two such psychological techniques include hypnosis, which involves the 
administration of a hypnotic induction, involving suggestions for reduced awareness and meta-
awareness [38], and meditation, which involves a variety of practices with the intent to foment 
awareness of mental representations [39]. A hypnotic induction reliably produces a tendency to 
underestimate time, particularly in highly suggestible individuals [6, 8], who comprise approximately 
10-15% of the population [38]. Alongside distortions in time perception, highly suggestible individuals 
routinely experience states of depersonalization and derealization spontaneously following a 
hypnotic induction [39]. Although they have not been systematically studied, depersonalization 
disorder patients are similarly known to experience pronounced disruptions in time perception [39] 
and drugs that elicit distortions in time perception also induce depersonalization [41]. In contrast, 
preliminary evidence suggests that meditation training produces a tendency to overestimate 
intervals [42]. 
The mechanisms underlying these distortions are not well understood but may lie in atypical 
metacognition in these populations. A common theme in models of hypnosis is that highly 
suggestible individuals are characterized by impaired executive monitoring and that the ability to 
respond to hypnotic suggestions is facilitated by reduced awareness of intentions underlying 
Claustrum, Consciousness, and Time Perception           
 
 
7 
responses [38, 43]. Following a hypnotic induction, highly suggestible individuals exhibit reduced 
medial prefrontal cortex activity [44] as well as reduced frontal-parietal alpha [8] and frontal-central-
central beta synchrony [45] relative to low suggestible individuals. These changes implicate default 
mode, executive attention, and motor networks involved in metacognition, cognitive control, and 
interval timing [46]. In contrast, there is evidence suggesting that meditators have greater awareness 
of their intentions to act [39]. Cumulatively, these results suggest that awareness of mental 
representations is closely intertwined with one’s perception of time. 
Striatal Beat Frequency (SBF) model of interval timing 
In the striatal beat frequency (SBF) model of interval timing [29, 47, 48, 49, 50] duration estimation is 
based upon the coincidence detection of oscillatory processes in cortico-striatal circuits. The SBF 
model supposes that at the onset of a “to be timed” signal, populations of cortical (and thalamic) 
neurons phase reset (and synchronize) and begin oscillating at their endogenous periodicities. 
Dopamine release from the ventral tegmental area at the onset of the signal is believed to play a 
part in this resetting function for cortical neurons while also acting as a ‘start gun’, and dopamine 
release from the substantia nigra pars compacta at signal onset works in a similar fashion to reset 
the weights of the synaptic connections in the dorsal striatum [51]. The detection of coincident 
activation of specific cortical oscillatory patterns is the role of striatal medium spiny neurons (MSNs). 
The adjustment of cortico-striatal synaptic weights allows the MSNs to discriminate and become 
‘tuned’ to specific patterns of coincident oscillatory activity, thus increasing their likelihood of firing 
upon similar patterns of cortical activation in the future. This property accounts for the close 
correspondence between interval timing and working memory performance, which are held to 
depend on the same neural representation of a specific stimulus [18•]. Given that oscillatory 
activation repeats itself at regular intervals (its period) and changes in a systematic manner as a 
function of time (its phase), these cortical oscillatory patterns, when observed across neurons 
differing in their intrinsic periodicity, can represent time intervals in the seconds-to-minutes range 
although their neural firing occurs in the milliseconds range. The MSNs are able to detect these 
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patterns, which bear resemblance to musical chords, by acting as coincidence detectors or 
‘perceptrons’ [52]. Striatal output travels to the thalamus along two pathways: the direct (dopamine 
D1 receptor-mediated) and indirect (dopamine D2 receptor-mediated), then loops back to the cortex 
and striatum, influencing the rate of oscillatory activity and permitting alterations in clock speed by 
changing the input to MSNs [53]. Differential activity in the direct and indirect pathways of the basal 
ganglia may serve to start, stop, or reset the timing process [49]. Consequently, the SBF model has 
the advantage of being consistent with the known psychophysics, neuropharmacology, and 
neuroanatomy of interval timing while at the same time making testable predictions regarding the 
functioning of its components [20•, 48, 51, 54, 55, 56]. A unified timing model that incorporates the 
SBF model of beat-based timing using cortico-striatal circuits and duration-based models using 
olivocerebellar circuits is outlined in Figure 2. This model is based on coordinated activity in the core 
striatal and olivocerebellar networks that are interconnected with each other and the cerebral cortex 
through multiple synaptic pathways [20•, 57]. 
Claustrum and consciousness  
 
Crick and Koch described how the claustrum might play a role in integrating separate sensations 
into the unitary percepts that we experience as consciousness [16]. Smythies and colleagues [13, 
14, 58, 59••] subsequently presented a more detailed hypothesis about how such temporal 
integration might occur based on higher-order temporal synchronization and the neuroanatomy of 
the claustrum. The claustrum is broadly divided into 3 sub-regions, the anterior-dorsal region 
connected with somatosensory and motor cortices, a posterior dorsal region connected with the 
visual cortex, and a ventral area connected to the auditory cortex [60, 61, 62••, 63, 64, 65•]. The 
claustrum has reciprocally distributed projections to virtually all regions of the cortex (e.g., frontal, 
premotor, ventral anterior cingulate, ventral temporal, visual, motor, somatosensory, olfactory, and 
entorhinal cortex), as well as sub-cortical structures (e.g., caudate nucleus, putamen, globus 
pallidus, and lateral amygdala) that are illustrated in Figure 1. These extensive bilateral and 
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interclaustral connections support the hypothesis that the claustrum serves as a ‘synchrony 
detector’, thereby coordinating information sharing and binding throughout the brain [13, 16]. 
White et al. [66] have recently reported unanticipated findings relating to the anatomy of connections 
between the claustrum and the cortex. These include the observation that the projections from non-
cingulate cortex to the claustrum are discrete, sparse and mainly directed to the contralateral 
claustrum while projections from the claustrum to the non-cingulate cortex are discrete, sparse and 
directed to the ipsolateral cortex. In contrast, the cingulate cortex projects mainly to the contralateral 
claustrum and the claustrum projects to the ipsolateral cortex as above. The connections between 
the claustrum and the cingulate, however, are both diffuse and massive with discrete regions in the 
cingulate cortex projecting to most of the claustrum and vice versa. These anatomical connections 
suggest that the main output of the claustrum to the motor-control system doesn’t go via the sparse 
direct route, but via the dense route with a relay in the cingulate cortex. This allows the claustrum to 
play a modulatory role in all the many functions of the cingulate cortex besides controlling motor 
output and behavior via the premotor cortex. These findings also require an extension of the 
proposed functions of the claustrum as outlined by Smythies and colleagues [67]. 
Although other brain areas have extensive interconnections (e.g., amydala, parietal cortex, 
thalamus), one way in which the claustrum is distinctive is in the proportion of claustral-cortical 
neurons that use synaptic zinc. Traditionally, Zn+ neurons have been associated with hippocampal 
mossy fibers and the generation of synchronized oscillations associated with activity-dependent 
neuroplasticity. The relatively dense zinc-positive (Zn+) terminations in the claustrum suggest the 
ability to coordinate multisensory processes more effectively given that synaptically released zinc is 
thought to control a 'window' of postsynaptic excitability without altering firing rates [68, 69]. 
Cortico-claustral-cortico circuits provide for strong feed forward inhibitory (FFI) processes. An 
FFI is composed of a group of pre-synaptic neurons that directly excite both glutamaterigic excitatory 
and GABAergic inhibitory interneurons and provide greater synaptic input to the latter [70]. The post-
synaptic neurons are interconnected and circuits that lack inhibition simply relay pre-synaptic activity 
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to post-synaptic neurons. In contrast, post-synaptic neurons in an FFI are highly sensitive to the 
relative timing of action potentials, and this allows for the modulation of neural synchrony as 
transmitted by the pre-synaptic neurons [59••]. Neuromodulators and feedback connections may 
modulate the temporal sensitivity of such circuits and gate the propagation of synchrony into other 
layers as well as sub-cortical and cortical areas [58]. The prevalence of strong FFI circuits 
throughout the brain suggests that synchrony codes in conjunction with time-sensitive cortico-
thalamic-basal ganglia (CTBG) circuits are the basis for the temporal integration required for 
consciousness. In this manner, the claustrum is able to support the full continuum of consciousness 
through the coordination of CTBG timing circuits in conjunction with cortical-striatal-hippocampal-
insular networks, thereby creating a timing-based conscious experience [72, 73••]. 
This hypothesis also suggests that the claustrum plays an important executive function. Our 
proposal is that decision-making is mediated by select assemblies of neurons, with synchronized 
oscillations at different gamma frequencies, that carry integrated sensory information modulated by 
saliency (reinforcing) mechanisms. These assemblies compete on a winner-take-all basis for access 
to the output from the claustrum to the prefrontal and premotor cortices. In this way the winner 
directs the voluntary decision-based behavior of the subject. Exact timing of these events plays a 
crucial role in the system. 
Goll and colleagues [74••] have recently proposed a hypothesis that the claustrum is closely 
involved in selective attention. They hypothesize that a widespread top-down input from the 
prefrontal cortex to the claustrum competitively modulates the output from the claustrum to various 
cortical localities. This allows the claustrum initially to process many different sensory objects 
simultaneously, and then to allow just one of these at any moment to constitute the center of 
attention with the inhibition of its competitors. The claustrum is further subject to down-up 
modulation by unexpected stimuli from sensory cortices that can over-ride the selective attention 
strategy. The claustrum also has a projection to the motor cortex including the frontal eye fields that 
promote motor movements, such as eye and neck movements, which modulate the focus of 
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attention and has been likened to a mechanism for moving the ‘spotlight’ of attention.  
Some recent evidence has cast doubt on the role of the claustrum in consciousness [75]. 
Combat veterans with penetrating traumatic brain injuries were studied in terms of the effects of 
claustrum lesions and loss of consciousness on long-term cognitive functions. The extent of 
claustrum damage was associated with the duration, but not the frequency, of loss of 
consciousness. This could be interpreted as indicating that the claustrum plays an important role in 
regaining consciousness, but not in maintaining cognitive function. In contrast, other researchers 
have reported that selective bilateral lesions of the claustrum and external capsule resulting from 
herpes simplex encephalitis and Sugihiritake mushroom poisoning leads to severe encephalopathy 
with disruptions in consciousness, psychotic symptoms and seizures [62••]. A specific role for the 
claustrum in auditory scene analysis as reflected by sensitivity to sensory change has also been 
identified [76]. Cogent to the current hypothesis, Wittmann and colleagues [77] assessed the effect 
of size and localization of brain lesions on the perception of the temporal order of two acoustic 
stimuli. Although a moderate association of lesion size and temporal-order threshold was observed 
among all brain-lesions patients, a clear temporal discrimination deficit was specifically observed in 
those patients with damage to the claustrum. Unfortunately, no assessment of consciousness was 
made in this study; hence correlations between temporal processing and consciousness couldn’t be 
performed. Similar types of impairments in temporal order and spatial reversal learning have been 
observed in rats following lesions of the anterior claustrum [78]. Moreover, the impairments in 
duration discrimination produced by lesions of the dorsal striatum were magnified as a function of 
the extent of collateral damage to the claustrum [79]. 
In support of the role of the claustrum in timing and time perception, a meta-analysis of fMRI 
studies [80] showed activation of the claustrum during the timing of supra-second durations, 
particularly in reproduction tasks. Subsequent neuroimaging studies have shown activation of the 
insula/insular cortex (a region closely related to the claustrum) in a variety of timing tasks [81, 82]. 
Moreover, Koubeissi et al. [83] recently reported a case study in which the researchers were 
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apparently able to turn consciousness "on and off" by stimulating a small area of the 
claustrum/insular cortex. 
Conclusions 
We endorse the ‘attention hypothesis’ for claustrum function [74••], which can readily be combined 
with the SBF model whereby the claustrum serves an executive function for the selection of the 
stimuli to be processed within the multiplexing system of interval timing and working memory [18•]. 
In this manner, the claustrum is able to modulate synchronized oscillations from widely distributed 
cortical regions in order to determine which patterns of spike coincidence-detection should be 
processed by cortico-striatal-thalamo-cortical timing circuits – either individually (selective attention) 
or in parallel (divided attention). The anatomical details and attentional functions of this type of time-
sharing system have been previously described [74••], but the specific neurophysiological 
mechanisms remain to be delineated. The basis for this mechanism is suggested by recent evidence 
indicating the role of competitive synchronized gamma oscillations organized by the Pearson 
mechanism [59••]. In addition, we propose that the motor output from the claustrum mediates the 
selection of all voluntary behaviors as well as the movements modulating the focus of attention [67]. 
Future experimental work addressing the relation between self and time [84] should be designed to 
test these predictions regarding duration and temporal order discrimination as well as attentional 
time-sharing and simultaneous temporal processing [85, 86, 87] using optogenetic and designer 
receptor exclusively activated by designer drug (DREADD) techniques within the claustrum and 
CTBG [62••, 88, 89, 90]. Such studies should allow for the dissection of beat-based versus interval-
based timing [57] within temporal windows defining past, present, and future states of awareness 
[91, 92, 93] while taking into account the flow of time from temporal sensation to time perception and 
production in the service of consciousness and the relation between time and self [84, 94, 95, 96, 
97••]. 
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Figure captions. 
Figure 1. Input–output connectivity of the claustrum. The architecture of the input–output 
connectivity of the claustrum is charted in sagittal (A) and coronal (B) sections of the rodent brain. 
The primary inputs to the claustrum are from the cortical modalities, which display symmetrical 
reciprocal connections. Additional inputs come from the prefrontal cortex as well as subcortical 
inputs from the striatum, thalamus, amygdala, and dorsal raphe. Abbreviations: PrL, prelimbic 
cortex; ACA, anterior cingulate area; ILA, infralimbic area; MO, motor cortex; SS, somatosensory 
cortex; ENT, entorhinal area; AI, agranular insular area; PIR, piriform area; PrL, prelimbic area; Fr, 
frontal cortex; AUD, auditory cortex; VIS, visual cortex; STR, striatum; TH, thalamus; AMG, 
amygdala; HPC, hippocampus; DR, dorsal raphe. Coronal (C) section of the human brain showing 
the cortico-claustral medial pathway spreading between claustrum and basal ganglia using 
constrained spherical deconvolution tractography to map white matter fibers. Phylogenetic 
differences in the organization of the sensory systems of different species makes it difficult to identify 
homologous areas, consequently these illustrations should be taken as a general outline. Adapted 
from [62••, 74, 90]. 
Figure 2. A unified model of interval timing. The striatal network (blue) and the olivocerebellar 
network (green) are connected to each other via multiple loops, and with the thalamus, pre-
SMA/SMA, and the cerebral cortex. Separate bi-directional circuits connect the claustrum to the 
cortex and the striatum. Dopaminergic pathways are shown in orange, inhibitory projections in blue, 
excitatory projections in red, and known anatomical connections in solid lines, respectively. 
Abbreviations: GPe, globus pallidus external; GPi, globus pallidus internal; IO, inferior olive; SMA, 
supplementary motor area; SNpc, substantia nigra pars compacta; SNpr, substantia nigra pars 
reticulate; STN, subthalamic nucleus; VTA, ventral tegmental area. Adapted from [20, 57, 97••]. 
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